Introduction
The object of this paper is to modify the canonical representative agent discounted optimal growth model with log utility and Cobb-Douglas production function to include many households, each with a different discount factor. The planner's welfare function is taken to be a weighted function of the underlying households' intertemporal utility functions. The weights are predetermined and fixed for all time as the planner solves the optimization problem. This maximization problem is a well-known way to compute a particular Pareto optimal allocation for a many agent Ramsey model.
1 By varying the welfare weights it is possible to trace out the economy's utility possibility frontier and find all the Pareto optimal allocations. This procedure also yields a proof of the existence of a competitive equilibrium by combining the welfare theorems with Negishi's (1960) existence argument.
The qualitative properties of the welfare maximization problem and the detailed development of the Negishi argument can be found for the general onesector model in the papers by Duran and Le and Le Van and Vailakis (2003) . The latter authors prove that the optimal capital sequence is convergent, but not necessarily monotonic, in a general one-sector framework. My example supplements their results by showing the optimal paths starting from different initial stocks come together in the limit. Mitra (1979) calls this the optimal capital sequences' twisted turnpike property. A second contribution is to show that each optimal capital sequence starting from an arbitrary initial capital stock is eventually monotonic.
That eventual monotonicity of the optimal capital sequence is the best possible convergence property reflects a point made by Le Van and Vailakis (2003) .
Consider the case where both agents have positive welfare weights, yet the economy starts off with the stationary optimal capital stock for the representative agent economy when the welfare weight is concentrated entirely on the most patient agent. It turns out in the Le Van and Vailakis paper that this capital stock is the attractor for the long-run optimal sequence and that sequence is not a constant one. 2 In fact, the first period's capital stock must be smaller than the initial stock in this situation. Put differently, this starting stock is not a steady state for the heterogeneous agent optimum growth model even though it is the limit point of the optimal accumulation program. This fact is also easily proven in the example given the solution's explicit formulas in terms of the economy's primitive taste and technology parameters.
The two-agent model is setup in Section 3 following a review of the representative agent example in Section 2. The basic two-agent welfare optimization problem is transformed to a representative agent problem with a time varying discount factor in Section 3. The Twisted Turnpike result also appears there along with a demonstration based on the formal properties of the policy function sequences constructed in Section 4. Section 5 develops the qualitative dynamics of the model including results on the optimal path's eventual monotonicity property. Concluding comments appear in Section 6.
4
Frank Ramsey's (1928) seminal article on optimal capital accumulation concentrated on a single planner's infinite horizon optimization problem. Modern economic theorists interpret this planning problem's solution as a perfect foresight competitive equilibrium for an economy with a representative agent whose preferences coincide with the planner's preferences over future consumption streams.
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The logarithmic utility, Cobb-Douglas production economy is an important example of Ramsey's one-sector optimal growth problem. Let consumption and capital at time t be denoted by c t and x t , respectively. The planner solves the discrete time program
subject to the constraints c t + x t ≤ Lx ρ t−1 , for t = 1, 2, . . . and c t , x t ≥ 0 for all t with x 0 ≤ k the given initial capital stock. Here 0 < δ, ρ < 1 are this economy's deep taste and technology parameters; L is a factor which reflects the quantity of fixed labor. For the representative agent case L = 1 and for the case of two agents supplying identical labor services analyzed below L = 2 1−ρ as the underlying production function in capital and labor is taken to be Cobb-Douglas.
This Ramsey problem is explicitly solved by a variety of methods. 4 The solution is described by the consumption policy function H(k) = (1 − δρ)Lk ρ and the capital policy function h(k) = δρLk ρ . At each date, the policy functions tell the decision maker how much to consume and how much to save given the current level of the capital stock, k. The optimal decision taken at any date depends only upon the amount of capital the planner starts the period with and not on the particular moment in calender time. This is the time consistency
property.
The optimal capital and consumption sequences are computed by iterating the policy functions. Carrying out that iteration leads to the explicit solution for the capital sequence:
where k 0 (k) = k is the given initial capital stock.
The optimal capital sequence is monotonic and converges to the unique positive fixed point of the capital policy function. That fixed point, k (δ), is called the modified golden-rule level of capital and satisfies the equation
If the positive initial capital is below the modified golden-rule, then the economy accumulates capital and the sequence of optimal capital stocks increases and converges to the modified golden-rule capital stock. Similarly, the optimal capital stocks decrease and converge to the modified golden-rule when the starting stock is larger than the positive fixed point. If the initial capital happens to equal the modified golden-rule stocks, then it will be optimal to maintain those stocks in every period. Thus, the modified golden-rule is a steady state of the dynamical system
The corresponding consumption sequence is also monotonic since the consumption policy function is increasing in capital. The resulting consumption sequence converges to the modified golden-rule consumption level defined by
The convergence of the optimal capital and consumption sequences is known as the turnpike theorem. Finally, note that the turnpike property implies that
That is, the optimal capital sequences "come together" as t tends to infinity. This obtains in the two agent example developed below and the optimal capital sequence is shown to be eventually monotonic.
7
Assume for simplicity that there are only two households, denoted by h = 1, 2, with lifetime utility given by
is a given (nonnegative) consumption sequence and 0 < δ h < 1 is the agent's discount factor and δ 2 < δ 1 . Let λ ≥ 0 denote the welfare weight assigned to agent 1 and
(1 − λ) the welfare weight assigned to the second agent. Assume further that 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 until otherwise noted. The cases where λ equals zero or one reduce to representative agent problems of the form found above. The planner's welfare maximization problem is
by choice of nonnegative sequences {c
The parameter L is the labor input to the production process. Note that both households inelastically supply one unit of identical labor services at each time to a Cobb-Douglas production function
The welfare maximization problem's objective can be rewritten as
Define aggregate consumption at time t as c t with c 
by choice of nonnegative consumption levels c where λ is given and 0 < λ < 1. The function u(t, λ, c t ) is this program's value function. This auxiliary problem's first order conditions imply that
Using the constraint, it is easy to show that each agent's optimal consumption share can be written as
, and
These equations yield an interesting result. Notice that (δ 2 /δ 1 ) t−1 & 0 as
provided the aggregate consumption path is bounded away from zero along a welfare maximizing path. This will hold as long as the initial capital stocks are positive. Hence, the first household emerges as the dominant consumer; its consumption approaches one hundred percent of the economy's aggregate consumption and the second household's consumption shrinks towards zero.
5
The calculation of each agent's consumption share yields the explicit form of the value function by substitution. That is,
where
From the viewpoint of intertertemporal maximization, a sequence {c t , k t−1 } ∞ t=1
solves the welfare optimization problem if and only if it solves the problem
by choice of nonnegative sequences {c t , k t−1 } ∞ t=1 subject to
and k 0 ≤ k, with k > 0 given. The information stored in the value function u is sufficient to decompose the aggregate consumption into the optimal consumption allocations for each agent given the preassigned welfare weights.
The constant γ t defined at each time does not depend on the aggregate consumption's level or how it is allocated across households. Hence, the {γ t } have no influence on the determination of the optimal aggregate consumption or capital accumulation paths and can be neglected when calculating the welfare maximizing optimal program. So, the welfare maximization problem is solved if and only if the Ramsey problem with a time variable discount factor defined below is solved. The latter problem is expressed as the Welfare Optimization Problem:
Here the planner's discount factor at time t, focal date time 0, can also be written as
The dependence of ∆ t on the choice of the welfare weight λ is suppressed in this notation. This time-varying discount factor is clearly the weighted average of the two agents' discount factors where the weights are given by the preassigned welfare weights. Problem P(y, ∆, L) is an example of the time varying discounted optimal growth model studied by Mitra (1979) .The se-
does not form a geometric sequence, unlike the sequences
for h = 1, 2. This implies that the optimal welfare maximizing path of consumption is not time consistent in the manner defined by Strotz (1955) , in contrast to the representative agent model discussed above. A direct argument supporting this conclusion is found in Section 4.
The main result is:
capital sequences starting from the endowments y and y # , respectively, then
The welfare optimization problem P(y, ∆, L) is explicitly solved, and the theorem proved, using Boyd's symmetry technique (1986, 1990) . 6 Let
Clearly μ j depends on the choice of the welfare weight, λ, and
This model's optimal capital stock at time t, denoted by k t (y), has the explicit form:
where y = Lk ρ is the output of goods available at time 1 given the initial stocks k.
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Now suppose that k # is any other initial capital stock, y # = L(k # ) ρ and the corresponding optimal capital sequence is denoted by {k t ¡ y
As 0 < ρ < 1, this last equation implies ln z t → 0 as t → ∞ and hence z t → 1 as t → ∞. In particular, this means that¯k t (y) − k t ¡ y # ¢¯→ 0 as t → ∞. Put differently, the optimal capital accumulation sequences starting from different initial capital stocks converge to each other, or come together, in the limit. The optimal capital sequence exhibits the twisted turnpike property.
There is a feasible path of capital accumulation in which aggregate consumption is stationary, over time as is the capital stock, which also satisfies the condition δ 1 ρLk ρ−1 = 1. This last equation is the steady state capital stock for the Ramsey optimal growth model when λ = 1 and c 2 t = 0 -the case where the model collapses to a single agent problem with the first agent's welfare receiving all the planner's weight in the objective. One might think that the stocksk so defined would attract, in the limit, the economy's aggregate capital stocks when both agents have positive welfare weights. After all, agent 2's consumption converges to zero as time unfolds, so perhaps it is possible thatk is the limiting capital stock for those nontrivial welfare weights. This turns out to be true, but the reason is very subtle. The convergence of the optimal capital sequences along the twisted turnpike tok is true, but that stock is not itself a steady state. This is a fundamental property of the many agent Ramsey model and it shows one way in which the many agent problem differs significantly from the representative agent model. The factk is not a stationary equilibrium stock is a consequence of a general result due to Le Van and Vailakis (2003) , but is easily shown for my example. Their theorem states that the constant path defined bȳ k = k t is not an optimal path from initial stocks k 0 =k and hence, it is not a stationary equilibrium. I give an independent proof of this fact to illustrate one benefit derived from knowing the example's explicit solution.
Proposition 1.k is not a steady state for the Welfare Optimization Prob-
Proof. It is shown in Section 4 that this problem is solved by calculating a sequence of policy functions, one for each period of time. The general form of the optimal decision at time t is
where y t is the output available at the start of period t. Iterating from time t = 1 starting at y 1 ≡ y yields k t (y) as displayed in (3). In particular,
in period 1. Set y = Lk ρ ; a simple calculation shows k 1 <k. Hence,k is not a steady state for P(y, ∆, L).
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Le Van and Vailakis' Theorem shows something more: the optimal capital sequence initiated atk converges to it in the long-run even though it is not a constant sequence. 9 In this case, {k t (ȳ)} is not monotonic since k 1 (ȳ) <k. The twisted turnpike property implies all optimal capital sequences converge to the stockk as time tends to infinity. In particular, this implies that if the economy starts with the stocksk, then it is optimal for the planner to deviate from those stocks and only return to them asymptotically. The resulting optimal capital sequence may not be monotonic, although it turns out to be eventually monotonic. 10 In part, this reflects the fact that the households enjoy time varying consumption along their optimal path. The aggregate consumption levels change over time, but the first household emerges as the dominant consumer in the limit.
The Symmetry Solution
This section details the symmetry solution to the Welfare Optimization Problem, the derivation of a sequence of Bellman equations of optimality, and the calculations giving rise to (3). Boyd's (1986 Boyd's ( , 1990 Let J (y|∆, L) be the value function for problem P(y, ∆, L)and let J (y|∆, 1)
be the value function for problem P(y, ∆, 1). Set ∆ = {∆ t } ∞ t=1 and put
, where S is the corresponding shift operator (also known as the backward shift operator). Symmetries mapping feasible (and optimal) solutions for problem P(y, ∆, 1) to P(y, ∆, L) underlie the computations supporting the Twisted Turnpike result.
Lemma 1. The symmetry S (c t , k t ) = e σt (c t , k t ) maps P(y, ∆, 1) to P(y, ∆, L). This mapping is 1 − 1 and onto for each L > 0. Here
Proof. Suppose {c t , x t } is a feasible program for problem P(y, ∆, 1). A routine computation shows the program defined by
is feasible for problem P(y, ∆, L). The planner's discounted utility in the first problem is P ∞ t=1 ∆ t ln c t and it is P ∞ t=1 ∆ t ln c * t in the second. Clearly,
where the series P ∞ t=1 ∆ t σ t is convergent as it is the weighed average of series of the form P ∞ t=1 (δ h ρ) t−1 (h = 1, 2). Hence, {c t , x t } is at least as preferred as the feasible program {c t ,x t } for problem P(y, ∆, 1) if and only if the transformed sequences have the property {c * t , x * t } is at least as preferred as {c *
Corollary 2. The corresponding value functions are related as follows:
The symmetry S (•) did not act on the endowment, y. The symmetry T defined next maps P (y, ∆, 1) to P (θy, ∆, 1) for some positive constant θ.
Formally, given the feasible sequence {c t , x t } for P (y, ∆, 1), let
where τ t = ρτ t−1 and τ 1 = ln θ. Then, τ t = ρ t−1 ln θ; follow the same line of reasoning as in Lemma 1 and Corollary 2 to obtain:
Lemma 3.
Commentary: The trick here is to letȳ = 1 and for y 6 = 1 set θȳ = y. That is: θ = y. Then ln θ + lnȳ = lny, so, ln θ = lny.
Restating Lemma 3:
Lemma 3*.
J (y|∆, 1) = J (1|∆, 1) + ln y
Period 1 Policy Functions
J is differentiable in y (apply the argument developed by Mirman and Zilcha (1975) ). Hence
Equivalently,
Standard Mirman-Zilcha (1975) arguments yield the envelope relation:
Combining and solving for the first-period's optimal consumption and capital, given the endowment yields:
Lemma 5.
c 1 = ∆ 1 μ 1 y, and
The Le Van -Valiakis (2003) result thatk ≡ (δ 1 ρ) 1 1−ρ is NOT a steady state follows. This result also uses the symmetry structure to prove it for the case L = 1 and then know it can be mapped to the case L = 2 1−ρ . This result also depends crucially on 1 > λ > 0.
Corollary 6. Let L = 1; setȳ = (δ 1 ρ)
Policy Functions for t ≥ 2.
Bellman equations capturing the Principle of Optimality are expressed for each time t, with focal date time 0:
Here,
(1 − δ 2 ρ) .
Lemma 7. For each t:
Now iterate: start at t = 1 with the endowment, y. Then (recalling L = 1):
and so on. Note: It is easy to verify that 0 < ³ 1 − μ t ∆t´< 1 for each t.
Lemma 8. The optimal capital sequence up to period t is found by the formula:
The Twisted Turnpike property follows.
NOTE: When 1 > λ > 0, the terms
This means that the optimal policies at each time t depend on calendar timethis is the manifestation of the time inconsistency, or, the Strotz effect.
Everything is proven for L = 1. Use the symmetry maps to find the L = 2 1−ρ optimum.
The Convergence Theorem
The Twisted Turnpike property is a sweeping characterization of optimal solutions starting from different initial conditions. It does not fully exploit the information contained in the sequence of policy functions derived in the symmetry procedure. The following Convergence Theorem provides additional qualitative properties of each optimal path and refines the Twisted Turnpike property. The Convergence Theorem implies all sequences of optimal capital stocks converge tok independently of the initial conditions. The Convergence Theorem embodies the same conclusions as reached by Le Van and Vailakis (2003, Propositions 4 and 7) . The policy function based proof, exploiting all available information, is considerably shorter, and more elementary, than theirs which considers a broader class of utility and production functions. The basic logic of the argument is analogous to one pursued by Becker and Foias (1987) in a different heterogeneous agent model.
Theorem 2: Convergence. If {k t (y)} is the optimal capital sequence for the problem P (y, ∆, 1), then
Moreover, the sequence {k t (y)} is eventually monotonic.
For each y, y # > 0 the optimal capital sequences k t (y) →k and k t ¡ y # ¢ →k as t → ∞ implies the Twisted Turnpike property: 
Optimal capital sequences are computed by the recursion:
It will be convenient to define
and observe that h(k) ≥ g(k) with equality when k = 0 as δ 1 > δ 2 .
When the welfare weights are concentrated on one agent alone (λ = 1 or λ = 0), the corresponding policy function sequences are constant sequences for each k. In addition, each of the functions g and h has a unique positive fixed point. Clearlyk = h ¡k¢ and there is a unique k > 0 such that k = g (k).
Evidently, k <k. Moreover, k >k implies h(k) > k and 0 < k <k implies k < h(k). A similar property holds for g and k. Each element of the sequence of policy functions when 0 < λ < 1 also has a positive fixed point and related inequalities as seen in the next lemma.
Policy functions have a number of important properties expressed in the following list. The indexing of the policy function at time t by the weight λ is suppressed below to ease notation when the meaning is clear.
Lemma 9. For each given t :
and there is a unique k(t) > 0 such that
The proof is omitted as it is an easy consequence of the assumed properties of the production function. Suppose k =k, thenk > k(1). Hence, along an optimal path starting fromk, in period 1:
The next results list properties of sequences of policy functions. The first is the crucial Fence Property.
Proposition 2. For each t, and for each λ, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, and for each k,
Proof. The Proposition is valid if either λ = 0 or λ = 1. Assume 0 < λ < 1.
The result follows by showing θ t (k) − h(k) ≤ 0 and θ t (k) − g(k) ≥ 0 with strict inequalities whenever k > 0. Notice that it suffices to show for each t :
δ 2 ρ ≡ G is found by computing:
(1 − λ)
A similar argument shows
Assume that 0 < λ < 1 in the sequel unless expressly noted otherwise.
One immediate application of the Lemma 9B and Proposition 2 is the observation:
That is, the sequence of fixed points {k(t)} derived from the policy function sequence inherits the Fence Property in the form of inequalities given in (10).
These relations play an important role in proving the eventual monotonicity of the optimal capital sequence.
Another application of (10) occurs if k =k and t = 1. Thenk > k(1) and k 1 = θ 1 ¡k¢ <k, as promised earlier in Proposition 1.
The following results apply to sequences of policy functions, {θ t }, and the optimal capital sequence, {k t−1 } with k t = θ t (k t−1 ) and k 0 = k.
Lemma 10. The sequence of policy functions {θ t } converges pointwise to h. That is, for each k > 0
Moreover, the convergence is uniform on each compact interval [0, b], b > 0.
Proof.
Since (δ 2 /δ 1 ) < 1, it follows that
This implies (11).
This proves θ t → h uniformly on each non-empty compact interval.
The upper limit b used to define a particular compact interval [0, b] may be chosen as the maximum sustainable stock, but this interpretation is not required for the lemma's validity. Evidently the choice b = 1 is the maximum sustainable stock for the specification f (k) = k ρ . Hence, the policy function sequence converges to h uniformly on any compact interval containing the maximum sus-tainable stock. As typical of optimal growth models, the optimal accumulation sequence will eventually reside in that particular compact interval.
Lemma 10 tells us that the function h is well-approximated by the sequence of policy functions {θ t } even though h is NOT a policy function when 0 < λ < 1. The uniform convergence property suggests that the long-run qualitative properties of the aggregate capital stock should follow from the monotonicity properties of optimal paths when λ = 1 and h is the optimal policy function. In this sense, it should not be a surprise that monotonicity over all time periods might fail for finitely many periods when 0 < λ < 1. Over a sufficiently long time period agent 1 emerges as the dominant household and the welfare problem's solution emulates the case where ALL the welfare weight is placed on that person. The Convergence Theorem formalizes this intuition and is modeled by way of the following lemmas and corollaries.
Corollary 11. If the optimal capital sequence {k t−1 } has a limit, k
Proof. Ash (1970, Problem 4, p. 133) . But h(k * ) = k * > 0 if and only if k * =k.
The next result based on the Fence Property says there is a time such that k t−1 ≥ k. Its proof turns out to imply the optimal capital sequence cannot converge to zero.
Lemma 12. Given the optimal capital sequence {k t−1 }, there is a finite
Step I. Suppose there is a time T such that
by the Fence Property (10) and
. Hence, by Lemma 9B:
contradicting the assumption k T +1 < k T . Hence, it must be the case that
Step II. Assume that k t < k for all t. Then k ≥ k t+1 and k ≥ k t by the assumed condition. As k t−1 < k, either k t < k t−1 , or k t ≥ k t−1 hold as well.
In the first alternative, Step I implies k t+1 ≥ k t . In the second alternative
Hence, k t+1 ≥ k t obtains in either situation.
The Fence Property (10) once again yields :
Hence, k t+2 > k t+1 and k ≥ k t+2 (by assumption). The previous paragraph's argument can be repeated starting from any t, in particular at t = 1, to yield:
Thus, the sequence {k t−1 } is bounded above by k and it is eventually nondecreasing. 12 Therefore, the limit of this sequence exists, is smaller than or equal to k, and must be positive. Corollary 11 implies the limit should bek, which is larger than k, which is impossible. Therefore, there must exist some
The proof of Lemma 12 shows k t−1 9 0 as t → ∞. If k t−1 → 0, then there is a time T such that k t < k for all t ≥ T . But then repeating the argument in Step II of Lemma 12 from time T onwards shows {k t−1 } is eventually nondecreasing and convergent tok, which is impossible. Thus, Corollary 13. {k t−1 } optimal implies lim sup t→∞ k t > 0.
The Fence Property (10) tells us that if k t >k, then k(t + 1) <k < k t , so
There are two possibilities: either k t+1 >k or k t+1 ≤k.
The next result addresses the case where k t >k for all but a finite number of periods.
Lemma 14. Let {k t−1 } be the optimal capital sequence and suppose there is a T such that k t >k for all t ≥ T . Then lim t→∞ k t−1 =k and the convergence is eventually monotonic. In particular,
Repeated application of the Fence Property (10) and Lemma 9B yields (14).
Hence, the sequence {k t−1 } is eventually decreasing and bounded from below byk. Thus, k t−1 →k by Corollary 11.
The next result is concerned with situations in which there is a first time in which k t ≤k. This can arise either at the start, t = 1, or at some finite date T in the future. One quick application of Lemma 15, in combination with the previous result, is that T = 1 in Lemma 14.
Lemma 15. Let {k t−1 } be the optimal capital sequence and suppose there is a T such that k T ≤k. Then k t ≤k for all t ≥ T .
Proof.
Let T be the first time k T ≤k. The Fence Property (10) insures k(T +1) <k.
Then either case (A) or (B) occurs, where
In Case (A) Lemma 9B implies θ T +1 (k T ) = k T +1 ≥ k T with equality if and
In Case (B), Lemma 9B, once again, implies
Therefore, k T +1 <k holds in either case. Repeat the argument at T + 2, and so on. The conclusion follows.
The last step in proving the Convergence Theorem is to show that once the optimal capital stock falls belowk it yields a monotonically nondecreasing capital sequence thereafter.
Lemma 16. Let {k t−1 } be the optimal capital sequence and suppose there is a T such that k T ≤k. Then
Hence, the optimal capital sequence is eventually nondecreasing and converges tok.
Simplify notation in the proof by dropping the T notation and understand the argument applies for all t taken sufficiently large. The previous lemma implies that once k t ≤k then k t+1 ≤k, k t+2 ≤k, and so on.
or there is a first time, t such that
again have two possibilities:
These alternatives are also the only ones that can arise whenever Subcase (b)
occurs. Thus, we may continue in this manner to produce the alternatives:
In the first situation, k t & k * for some k * . Clearly k * > 0 by Corollary 13.
Thus, k * =k by Corollary 11. This can only occur if k t =k for all t. Hence,k must be a steady state, which is impossible as
or any t when 0 < λ < 1. Thus, the only remaining possibility is for all t sufficiently large,
In this event, k t %k as well.
The proof of Theorem 2 follows from Lemmas (and Corollaries) 9-16.
Just note that the optimal capital sequence {k t−1 } must satisfy the hypotheses of either Lemma 14 or Lemma 15 (and, hence Lemma 16) and those cases are mutually exclusive.
The need for qualifying statements such as eventually nondecreasing or eventually increasing is necessary to accommodate special cases of optimal solutions.
The easiest example occurs in the now familiar situation where the economy starts atk with k 1 = θ 1 ¡k¢ <k. The first period's stocks decline from the ones given in the initial condition, but the optimal sequence of capital eventually increases over time and converge tok.
.Concluding Comments
The monotonicity of the optimal capital sequence is a fundamental property of the representative agent model. It implies that the shadow prices supporting the optimal path are also monotonic. In particular, if the capital sequence is increasing, then capital's rental price (its marginal product) declines and the wage rises over time. Bliss (1975 Bliss ( , 1999 calls this feature the "Orthodox Vision" of capital theory. This property is easily seen in the familiar log utility, CobbDouglas production, representative agent example.
The heterogeneous agent extension of this example cannot exhibit the Orthodox Vision as a result of the Le Van and Vailakis (2003) theorem. The twisted turnpike property in the example implies | f 0 (x t−1 (k) − f 0 (x t−1 (k 0 ) |→ 0 as t → ∞, where f 0 (x) = ρLx 1−ρ is capital's marginal product. That is, the rental prices of capital come together from two different initial conditions. However, the sequence of rental prices from a given initial condition are not generally monotonic as the sequence {f 0 (x t−1 (k)} ∞ t=1 fails to be monotonic. However, the eventual monotonicity property exhibited along the turnpike shows that eventually the Orthodox Vision obtains provided the initial stocks start at or below k or fall belowk in finite time. The turnpike's "twists" occur early over an initial segment of finitely many periods before settling down to monotonic capital accumulation.
Notes
1 The example corresponds to the model in Le Van and Vailakis (2003) with 100 percent depreciation. The welfare maximization approach to optimal growth was developed in Bewley (1972) , Coles (1985 Coles ( , 1986 , Kehoe, (1989) , Kehoe and Levine (1985) , and Romer (1989, 1990) .
2 Note that they assume each agent's felicity function is bounded below, whereas the log felicity assumed here is not. This fact is demonstrated in my log utility example.
3 See Becker and Boyd (1997) for more on this interpretation of the planner's problem. 4 See Becker and Boyd (1997) , and Boyd (1986 Boyd ( , 1990 for the symmetry technique solution that underlies the example developed below. Other techniques are based on value function iteration using Bellman's optimality equation and Howard's policy improvement algorithm. 5 Rader formalized this result for exchange economies in Rader (1971 Rader ( , 1972 Rader ( , and 1981 .
The latter paper emphasizes the class of Bernoulli (iso-elastic) one-period return functions, which include the logartithmic case. A similar result is found in Kehoe (1989) for the twoperson exchange economy when agents have log felicity functions. Capital theoretic versions are found in Bewley (1982) , Coles (1985 Coles ( , 1986 , and Le Van and Vailakis (2003) . 6 The detailed development of this solution is deferred to the next section.
7 See Boyd ([8] p.253) as well as the discussion in Section 4 for details.
8 See the comments following Proposition 2 in Section 5.
9 Recall, they assume that the planner's felicity function is bounded below.
1 0 See Le Van and Vailakis (2003) for details as well as my arguments for the Convergence Theorem in the next section.
1 1 See Kamihigashi (2008) for related presentations of Bellman equations in non-stationary models.
1 2 In fact, it is increasing as the capital stocks are non-zero at each time, so a strict inequality actually obtains.
